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Abstract 
In this study we test the argument that information asymmetry and the problems of adverse 
selection provide incentives for managers to use accounting choices to signal relatively 
higher future prospects. Specifically, we contend that firms use accelerated depreciation to 
credibly signal higher future earnings and cash flows, consistent with signaling theory. 
Compared to straight-line depreciation, accelerated depreciation reduces earnings in the 
earlier years of asset lives and produces more variability in earnings. Despite these drawbacks, 
hundreds of firms voluntarily use accelerated depreciation for at least some of their 
depreciable assets. Our results indicate that the use of accelerated depreciation foreshadows 
higher future earnings and cash flows for horizons of one, two, and three years ahead.  
Keywords: Financial reporting, Depreciation choice, Operating performance, Signaling 
1. Introduction 
Accounting earnings are ascribed special importance by analysts (Brown 2001; Brown and 
Caylor 2005), investors (Dechow 1994; Kasznik and McNichols 2002), managers (DeAngelo 
1988; Bartov et al. 2002), contracting parties (Holthausen 1981; Leftwich 1981; Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, 1990), regulatory authorities (Jones 1991; Cahan 1992; Key 1997), and 
courts (DeAngelo 1986, 1990). Evidence suggests that managers are attuned to the 
importance that various stakeholders ascribe to earnings (Graham et al. 2005). A growing 
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body of evidence indicates that managers expend considerable time and effort managing both 
accruals (Healy and Wahlen 1999; Fields et al. 2001) and operating activities (Bartov 1993; 
Roychowdhury 2006; Xu et al. 2007; Cohen et al. 2008) to meet earnings thresholds. 
Evidence also suggests that managers oppose accounting standards that reduce earnings or 
increase earnings volatility and, in some cases, are willing to forego real economic value to 
improve near-term earnings (Mittelstaedt et al. 1995; Dechow et al. 1996; Bushee 1998; 
Espahbodi et al. 2002; Bhojraj and Libby 2005; Graham et al. 2005; Hodder et al. 2006; 
Jackson 2008) (Note 1). 
Given the importance widely ascribed to earnings, the voluntarily use of accounting methods 
that both reduce near-term earnings and increase earnings volatility is puzzling. Nonetheless, 
evidence reveals that hundreds of firms use accelerated depreciation rather than straight-line 
depreciation. Bowen et al. (1995) find that approximately 30 percent of firms use accelerated 
depreciation for at least some of their depreciable assets. A natural question, given the 
earnings-related consequences of accelerated depreciation, is why managers make this choice 
(Note 2). In this study, we provide an explanation for why some firms rationally choose to 
use accelerated depreciation – managers provide private information through their choice of 
depreciation method that influences the beliefs of rational investors.  
Using the intuition in Akerlof (1970), Ross (1977) illustrates that capital structure decisions 
may serve as credible signals about future firm performance. Leland and Pyle (1977) develop 
a model in which retained insider ownership signals firm quality in initial public offerings. 
The Leland and Pyle (1977) model suggests a positive relation between firm quality and 
leverage, much like Ross (1977). More recent studies find cash dividends, stock dividends, 
and stock splits can also serve as signals about higher future stock returns and better future 
operating performance (Healy and Palepu 1988; McNichols and Dravid 1990; Rankine and 
Stice 1997; Desai and Jain 1997).  
Based on the signaling models in corporate finance and in the accounting literature (Bagnoli 
and Watts 2005), we empirically test whether an accounting choice (the use of accelerated 
depreciation) serves as a credible signal about future operating performance. For an 
accounting choice to be a reliable signal, the cost of the signal must be higher for low quality 
firms than for high quality firms. Therefore, we hypothesize that firms that use accelerated 
depreciation will report higher future earnings and cash flows than firms that use straight-line 
depreciation. Of course, signals have varying degrees of reliability. A signal is more reliable 
if it is increasingly costly (and prohibitively so) to mimic.  
It is plausible that managers use a variety of signals in financial reporting disclosures, 
including a number of accounting choices. In our study, we focus on this specific accounting 
choice because the consequences of the choice are clear. Indeed, Ricks (1982, p. 71) indicates 
that ―it might be reasonable to argue that depreciation is one accounting issue where the 
effects of different methods are obvious and well understood.‖ 
To test our hypotheses, we use the two stage Heckman procedure (Heckman 1979; Maddala 
1983; Greene 2003) to control for endogeneity problems. In our primary tests, we estimate a 
first-stage probit model in which the depreciation choice is the dependent variable and 
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economic determinants of that choice are the independent variables (Bowen et al. 1995). In 
the second stage model, the dependent variables are measures of future operating 
performance and the independent variables include (i) a dummy variable for whether the firm 
uses accelerated depreciation, (ii) economic determinants of future operating performance, 
and (iii) the inverse Mills ratio which controls for the potential selection bias of the 
depreciation choice. 
In our models of future operating performance, we consistently find that the economic 
determinants of earnings and cash flows explain substantial fractions of the cross-sectional 
and temporal variation in these variables, consistent with prior research. In the presence of 
these economic determinants, we find that the use of accelerated depreciation is associated 
with higher levels of future earnings and cash flows (Note 3). This association is statistically 
significant at reliable levels for future earnings and cash flow (i.e., one, two, and three years 
ahead).  
This study makes a contribution to the accounting literature. We provide initial evidence that 
depreciation choices can signal higher future prospects. This contribution to the accounting 
literature is distinct from the contributions of prior studies which have examined the 
market-related consequences (Archibald 1972; Kaplan and Roll 1972; Beaver and Dukes 
1973), contracting consequences (Holthausen 1981; Leftwich 1981; Ricks 1982; Holthausen 
and Leftwich 1983; Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Fields et al. 2001), and capital investment 
consequences (Jackson 2008; Seybert 2010) of depreciation choice. Instead, we document 
that signaling theory appears (in part) to explain accounting choices made by managers.  
The remainder of this study proceeds as follows. Section 2 develops the hypotheses that we 
empirically test. Section 3 describes the methodology and variable definitions. Section 4 
provides the sample selection procedures and results. Section 5 provides further empirical 
evidence in supplemental analyses to enhance the reliability of our conclusions. The final 
section provides summary and concluding comments. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
2.1 Background 
Corporate insiders have an informational advantage over diffuse external investors (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976; Leland and Pyle 1977; Copeland and Weston 1988; Eisenhardt 1989; 
Brennan 1990). In the presence of information asymmetry and the inability of market prices 
to fully reflect all information about firms’ future prospects, firms are valued at average price 
(Riley 1979). That is, firms with more (less) favorable future prospects are undervalued 
(overvalued). In this setting, managers of firms that have favorable future prospects have 
incentives to find ways to credibly signal their private information to outside investors to 
avoid undervaluation (Akerlof 1970; Ross 1977; Leland and Pyle 1977; Riley 1979; 
Hirshleifer and Riley 1992; Milgrom and Roberts 1992). 
Ross (1977) illustrates how financial policy decisions can serve as credible signals that help 
to resolve the information asymmetry problem that naturally arises when absentee owners 
delegate decision making authority to professional managers. For a financial policy signal to 
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yield such a separating equilibrium, however, the cost of the signal must be decreasing in 
firm quality (Hirshleifer and Riley 1992; Copeland and Weston 1988; Milgrom and Roberts 
1992; Spence 1973). That is, the cost of the signal must be higher for low quality firms than 
for high quality firms. The incentive-signaling paradigm has been posited as a way to 
understand a variety of financial policy and related decisions. For example, one stream of 
research contends that cash dividends, stock dividends, stock splits, and open market 
repurchases signal higher future stock returns and better operating performance (John and 
Williams 1985; Lakonishok and Lev 1987; Ofer and Siegel 1987; Barclay and Smith 1988; 
Brennan and Copeland 1988; Healy and Palepu 1988; McNichols and Dravid 1990; Ikenberry 
et al. 1996; Rankine and Stice 1997; Desai and Jain 1997).  
A few examples of signaling theory are worthy of further exploration. Leland and Pyle (1977) 
analyze the role of signals within the process of initial public offerings (Note 4). They show 
that companies with good future prospects and higher possibilities of being successful (i.e., 
―good‖ companies) have incentives to signal to the market when going public (e.g., a 
significant percentage of the company will be retained by the owner). A reliable signal 
generally exists in the presence of information asymmetry and is viewed as too costly to be 
imitated by those companies with lower possibilities of success (i.e., ―bad‖ companies). 
Leland and Pyle (1977) show that the costs (i.e., a relatively larger equity stake is more costly 
to a manager of a ―bad‖ company) of imitating a signal are greater than the benefits. 
Similarly, Spence (1973) argues that a signal can be used to distinguish high and low 
productive workers. In his model, high productive workers can acquire education at a lower 
cost (e.g., less time, fewer direct costs, fewer other tradeoffs) than low productive workers. 
Spence illustrates how a signaling equilibrium exists in which high productive workers look 
for greater education in relation to low productive workers, and greater levels of education 
result in higher wages offered by employers. In his model, education serves as a reliable 
signal of potential productivity levels because the costs of mimicking are higher than the 
benefits (to low productive workers).  
2.2 Depreciation Choice and Future Operating Performance 
Although research suggests that managers use financial policy and related decisions to 
credibly signal higher future stock returns and operating performance, there is a limited 
amount of empirical evidence about the signaling role of accounting choices. With imperfect 
and incomplete markets, financial reporting disclosures can be efficient mechanisms to 
address market imperfections. Closely related to our motivation is empirical evidence that 
managers signal private information in accrual decisions. Subramanyam (1996) concludes 
that discretionary accruals are interpreted by investors as signals about the future financial 
prospects of firms. Louis and Robinson (2005) conclude that discretionary accruals recorded 
before stock-split announcements are interpreted by investors as signals of managerial 
optimism rather than managerial opportunism. However, research has yet to provide 
compelling evidence of whether accounting method choices are used by managers to credibly 
signal the favorable future prospects of firms.  
International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting 
ISSN 2162-3082 
2019, Vol. 9, No. 1 
http://ijafr.macrothink.org 93 
For an accounting choice to credibly signal higher future operating performance, the 
alternative accounting method must produce costs that are decreasing in firm quality, making 
the choice especially costly for firms with poor future prospects to imitate. Evidence suggests 
that firms’ depreciation choice fits this requirement. Although the total amount of 
depreciation expense will be the same regardless of the choice of depreciation method (Note 
5), the choice of accelerated depreciation produces less short-term earnings and more 
variability in earnings.  
The culture in many organizations emphasizes the primacy of financial performance 
measures (Morgan 1997; Jensen 2001). Earnings are often viewed as the single most 
important financial performance metric (Dechow 1994; Graham et al. 2005). Accounting 
choices that reduce near-term earnings and produce more variability in earnings are likely to 
be costly because such choices potentially (i) risk meeting earnings thresholds (Brown and 
Caylor 2005), (ii) reduce managerial compensation (Gaver and Gaver 1998; Murphy 1999; 
Matsunaga and Park 2001), (iii) increase the likelihood of debt covenant violation (Watts and 
Zimmerman 1986, 1990; Sweeney 1994; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1994), (iv) reduce firms’ 
ability to raise external capital (Graham and Harvey 2001), (v) increase managerial turnover 
(Farrell and Whidbee 2003; Engel et al. 2003), (vi) decrease earnings predictability (Dichev 
and Tang 2009), and (vii) increase the perceived riskiness of the firm (Graham et al. 2005). 
Bagnoli and Watts (2005) offer a set of conditions that support a separating equilibrium for 
the signal in a depreciation choice. They show that investors can use the discretion in 
depreciation to infer private information about future prospects. As the costs of lower 
earnings and higher variability are expected to be relatively high for companies with poor 
future prospects, those managers will not mimic the depreciation reporting choice of 
managers who believe their firm’s prospects are relatively strong. At a minimum, we can 
conclude that the cost of the accelerated depreciation choice signal is decreasing (increasing) 
for firms with higher (lower) future prospects. Our hypothesis, stated in alternative form, is as 
follows: 
Hypothesis: Firms use the choice of accelerated depreciation as a positive signal to higher 
quality firms as evidenced by higher future prospects. 
We operationalize this hypothesis by testing whether firms that choose accelerated 
depreciation have more favorable future operating performance (in future earnings and future 
cash flows). That is, we predict a positive correlation between firm quality and the choice of 
accelerated depreciation.  
3. Methodology and Variables Measurement 
3.1 Overview 
Firms can choose between straight-line depreciation and accelerated depreciation under 
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) and evidence suggests that firms’ choice 
between these methods is non-random (Christie and Zimmerman 1994; Bowen et al. 1995). 
Therefore, we use the two stage Heckman procedure to account for the endogenous nature of 
firms’ depreciation choice (Heckman 1979). In the first stage, we use a probit model where 
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we regress depreciation choice on expected economic determinants of the decision. The key 
output of this model is the inverse Mills ratio, which is used in second stage models to control 
for the endogenous nature of firms’ depreciation choice. In the second stage models, we 
estimate two models to test whether depreciation choice is associated with higher future 
performance using future earnings and cash flows. The independent variables in the second 
stage models are (i) a dummy variable for firms’ depreciation choice, (ii) economic 
determinants of the dependent variable drawn from prior research, and (iii) the inverse Mills 
ratio, which is obtained from the first step probit model. A number of accounting studies have 
previously used the two stage Heckman procedure (e.g., see Shehata 1991; Christian et al. 
1994; Leuz and Verrecchia 2000; Barton 2001; Kim et al. 2003; and Tucker 2007). 
3.2 Depreciation Choice Model 
Bowen et al. (1995) document a number of economic determinants of firms’ depreciation 
choice. Their model is specified as follows: (Note 6) 
CHOICEit = λ0 + λ1DURit + λ2RDit + λ3LABORit + λ4DPENit + λ5(MFGit*COGSit) 
+ λ6(NMFGit*COGSit) + λ7NPit + λ8ADVit + λ9LEVMVit + λ10DROAit  
+ λ11SALEit + λ12(OGit*SALEit) + εit                                          (1) 
where 
CHOICEit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use the accelerated 
depreciation method for all or some of their assets, and 0 for firms that 
use the straight-line depreciation method; 
DURit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms producing durable goods (SIC 
codes 150 – 179, 245, 250 – 259, 283, 301, and 324 – 399), and 0 
otherwise; 
RDit = research and development expense scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if RD 
expense is missing); 
LABORit = labor intensity measured as one minus the ratio of gross property, plant, 
and equipment to ADJ_TAit (0 if gross property, plant, and equipment is 
missing); 
DPENit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with defined benefit pension plans, 
identified as those firms with a nonnegative value for projected pension 
obligation or assumed rate of return for pension benefits, and 0 
otherwise; 
MFGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for manufacturing firms (SIC codes 
200-399), and 0 otherwise; 
NMFGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for non-manufacturing firms (all SIC codes 
except 200-399), and 0 otherwise; 
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COGSit = cost of goods sold scaled by ADJ_TAit; 
NPit = notes payable scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if notes payable is missing); 
ADVit = advertising expense scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if advertising expense is 
missing); 
LEVMVit = ratio of long-term debt to market value of common stock (0 if long-term 
debt is missing); 
DROAit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with return on assets (defined as 
income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled 
by ADJ_TAit) in deciles 2 through 9, where deciles are defined within 
two-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise; 
SALEit = natural logarithm of net sales in thousands; 
OGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the oil and gas industry (SIC 
codes 131 and 291), and 0 otherwise; 
ADJ_TAit = average of beginning of year and end of year adjusted total assets, where 
adjusted total assets are equal to total assets plus accumulated 
depreciation; 
i, t = firm and year subscripts, respectively. 
We scale variables by average adjusted total assets, similar to Bowen et al. (1995). This 
adjustment adds back accumulated depreciation so that we do not scale by a variable that is 
influenced by depreciation choice. We also combine firms that only use accelerated 
depreciation with those that use a mix of accelerated and straight-line depreciation in defining 
CHOICEit. Our reason for doing this is because few firms use accelerated depreciation for all 
of their depreciable assets. In addition, our coding of CHOICEit is opposite by design of that 
in Bowen et al. (1995). Thus, the predicted signs of the coefficients are reversed. We make 
this coding change to help clarify the discussion of the results. Finally, because firms in our 
sample have repeated observations over time, we use clustered standard errors. 
3.3 Depreciation Choice and Future Operating Performance Model 
Prior theoretical and empirical research suggests a number of characteristics that are 
associated with future operating performance, and we draw on this literature. Our model 
expands the model in Barth et al. (2001) by adding (i) a dummy variable for firms’ 
depreciation choice, (ii) additional economic determinants, and (iii) the inverse Mills ratio 
(discussed above). The model is specified as follows:  
DV_1it+j = β0 + β1CHOICEit + β2CFOit + β3ΔARit + β4ΔINVit + β5ΔAPit 
+ β6DEPit + β7AMORTit + β8OTHERit + β9CFOit-1 + β10ACCit-1  
+ β11RETit + β12EPit + β13CAPit + β14AGEit + β15ATOit  
+ β16MILLSit + εit                                                             (2) 
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where 
DV_1it+j = dependent variable, defined as either ADJ_INCit+j or CFOit+j; 
ADJ_INCit+j = income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus 
depreciation expense scaled by ADJ_TAit; 
CFOit+j = net cash flow from operating activities minus the accrual portion of 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations reported on the 
statement of cash flows scaled by ADJ_TAit; 
ΔARit = change in accounts receivable from the statement of cash flows scaled 
by ADJ_TAit and multiplied by -1; 
ΔINVit = change in inventory from the statement of cash flows scaled by 
ADJ_TAit and multiplied by -1; 
ΔAPit = change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities from the statement 
of cash flows scaled by ADJ_TAit ; 
DEPit = depreciation expense, computed as depreciation and amortization 
expense minus amortization expense (coded as 0 if amortization 
expense is missing) scaled by ADJ_TAit ; 
AMORTit = amortization expense (coded as 0 if amortization expense is missing) 
scaled by ADJ_TAit ; 
OTHERit = net of all other accruals, calculated as income before extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations scaled by ADJ_TAit – (CFOit + 
ΔARit + ΔINVit – ΔAPit – DEPit – AMORTit); 
CFOit-1 = net cash flow from operating activities minus the accrual portion of 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations reported on the 
statement of cash flows scaled by ADJ_TAit ; 
ACCit-1 = total accruals scaled by ADJ_TAit ;  
RETit = stock return, computed as the year-to-year change in closing stock 
price divided by the prior year closing stock price; 
EPit = earnings-to-price ratio if the ratio is nonnegative and 0 if the ratio is 
negative, where the earnings-to-price ratio is defined as income before 
extraordinary items and discontinued operations divided by the market 
value of common equity; 
CAPit = logarithm of the market value of common equity; 
AGEit = logarithm of number of years firm has been listed on CRSP; 
ATOit = asset turnover, defined as net sales divided by ADJ_TAit ; 
MILLSit = inverse Mills ratio from estimation of Equation (1); 
i, t = firm and year subscripts, respectively; 
j = 1, 2, and 3. 
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The variable of interest in Equation (2) is CHOICEit, and our theory predicts that its 
coefficient will be positive. Seven of the control variables in Equation (2) are drawn from 
Barth et al. (2001) (CFOit, ΔARit, ΔINVit, ΔAPit, DEPit, AMORTit, and OTHERit). The 
coefficients on these variables are predicted to be positive, except for the coefficient on ΔAPit 
which is predicted to be negative. Equation (2) also includes lags of disaggregated income 
(CFOit-1 and ACC it-1) (Note 7). The coefficients on these variables are predicted to be 
positive. Finally, Equation (2) includes five economic determinants drawn from prior 
research (RETit, EPit, CAPit, AGEit, and ATOit) (Note 8). We expect that the coefficient on 
RETit to be positive because evidence shows that stock returns lead earnings (Beaver et al. 
1980; Kothari and Sloan 1992). We expect the coefficient on EPit to be negative because a 
smaller earnings-to-price ratio is an indicator of future growth in earnings (Penman 1996). 
We expect the coefficients on CAPit and AGEit to be positive because larger and more mature 
firms are likely to have better future operating performance than smaller, less mature firms 
(Anthony and Ramesh 1992; Black 1998). Finally, we expect the coefficient on ATOit to be 
positive because companies that more effectively utilize their assets are likely to have better 
future operating performance.  
4. Results 
4.1 Sample Selection 
Our sample starts with 1988 and extends through 2005. We start with 1988 because this is the 
first year cash flows from operations are disclosed in the statement of cash flows. Following 
prior research, we exclude regulated industries (SIC codes between 4000-4999) and financial 
institutions (SIC codes between 6000-6999). We require that firms have the needed 
Compustat financial data to construct variables in Equations (1) and (2) and have positive 
sales and stockholders’ equity (Note 9). After imposing these data restrictions, our sample for 
estimating Equations (1) and (2) consists of 56,303 firm years. To reduce the influence of 
outliers and extreme values on the results, we winsorize all variables (except for dummy 




 percentiles.  
4.2 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 provides the depreciation choice profile for our sample of 56,303 firm years by both 
year (Panel A) and industry (Panel B). Panel A shows that the popularity of straight-line 
depreciation choice has grown over our sample period. Panel B shows that our sample is a 
large cross-section of different industries. Our sample is comprised of 7,902 unique firms. 
The only industry that represents more than 10 percent of our sample firms is SIC two-digit 
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Table 1. Depreciation choice and industry sample profile 
Panel A. Depreciation choice profile by year 
 Straight-line Accelerated  Straight-line Accelerated 
 depreciation Depreciation  depreciation Depreciation 
Year # % # % Year # % # % 
1988 352 70.68 146 29.32 1998 3,094 81.25 714 18.75 
1989 1,877 72.53 711 27.47 1999 2,973 82.38 636 17.62 
1990 2,023 73.01 748 26.99 2000 2,979 83.17 603 16.83 
1991 2,075 73.87 734 26.13 2001 3,036 84.38 562 15.62 
1992 2,242 75.46 729 24.54 2002 2,872 84.52 526 15.48 
1993 2,443 77.48 710 22.52 2003 2,785 84.55 509 15.45 
1994 2,686 78.81 722 21.19 2004 2,662 85.21 462 14.79 
1995 2,804 79.23 735 20.77 2005 2,174 85.42 371 14.58 
1996 2,980 80.13 739 19.87 All years 45,193 80.27 11,110 19.73 
1997 3,136 80.64 753 19.36      
Panel B. Depreciation choice profile by industry 
SIC   % of % % 
code SIC code description # total SL ACC 
10 Metal mining 93 1.18 10.75 89.25 
13 Oil and gas extraction 349 4.42 15.47 84.53 
15 Building construction general contractors 55 0.70 74.55 25.45 
20 Food and kindred products 196 2.48 87.76 12.24 
22 Textile mill products 55 0.70 87.27 12.73 
23 Apparel and other finished products made from 
fabrics 91 1.15 75.82 24.18 
25 Furniture and fixtures 55 0.70 76.36 23.64 
26 Paper and allied products 91 1.15 59.34 40.66 
27 Printing, publishing, and allied industries 109 1.38 80.73 19.27 
28 Chemicals and allied products 711 9.00 86.50 13.50 
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29 Petroleum refining and related industries 54 0.68 31.48 68.52 
30 Rubber and miscellaneous plastics products 108 1.37 79.63 20.37 
32 Stone, clay, glass, and concrete products 56 0.71 62.50 37.50 
33 Primary metal industries 131 1.66 80.15 19.85 
34 Fabricated metal products 121 1.53 83.47 16.53 
35 Industrial and commercial machinery and 
equipment 617 7.81 83.14 16.86 
36 Electronic and other electrical equipment and 
components 721 9.12 83.50 16.50 
37 Transportation equipment 182 2.30 76.37 23.63 
38 Measuring, analyzing, and controlling 
instruments 626 7.92 84.19 15.81 
39 Miscellaneous manufacturing industries 104 1.32 75.00 25.00 
50 Wholesale trade durable goods 259 3.28 77.61 22.39 
51 Wholesale trade non-durable goods 134 1.70 78.36 21.64 
53 General merchandise stores 58 0.73 94.83 5.17 
54 Food stores 52 0.66 92.31 7.69 
56 Apparel and accessory stores 68 0.86 92.65 7.35 
57 Home furniture, furnishings, and equipment 
stores 53 0.67 92.45 7.55 
58 Eating and drinking places 152 1.92 94.74 5.26 
59 Miscellaneous retail 200 2.53 89.00 11.00 
73 Business services 1,269 16.06 88.49 11.51 
78 Motion pictures 79 1.00 48.10 51.90 
79 Amusement and recreation services 102 1.29 85.29 14.71 
80 Health services 223 2.82 91.48 8.52 
87 Engineering, accounting, management, and 
related services 207 2.62 84.06 15.94 
 Other SIC codes 521 6.59 77.54 22.46 
 Total 7,902 100.0   
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In both panels, ―accelerated depreciation‖ captures firms that use accelerated depreciation for 
all or some of their assets. In Panel B, ―Other SIC codes‖ captures 21 two-digit SIC codes 
containing fewer than 50 firms each. 
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the variables used in Equations (1) and (2). Table 2 
shows that the sample used to estimate Equations (1) and (2) includes 56,303 firm year 
observations. The sample is comprised of 45,193 firm years (80.27 percent of the sample) 
using straight-line depreciation and 11,110 firm years (19.73 percent of the sample) using 
accelerated depreciation.  
Table 2. Descriptive statistics 
 All firms  
(n = 56,303) 
Straight-line firms  
(n = 45,193) 
Accelerated firms  
(n = 11,110) 
Variables Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
CHOICEit 0.1973 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 1.0000 
DURit 0.4437 0.0000 0.4622 0.0000 0.3682 0.0000 
RDit 0.0444 0.0038 0.0497 0.0071 0.0225 0.0000 
LABORit 0.5929 0.6308 0.6241 0.6559 0.4659 0.4950 
DPENit 0.2916 0.0000 0.2707 0.0000 0.3765 0.0000 
MFGit*COGSit 0.3604 0.2483 0.3663 0.2571 0.3365 0.1896 
NMFGit*COGSit 0.3424 0.0000 0.3639 0.0000 0.2548 0.0000 
NPit 0.0241 0.0000 0.0236 0.0000 0.0259 0.0000 
ADVit 0.0110 0.0000 0.0120 0.0000 0.0073 0.0000 
LEVMVit 0.3492 0.0883 0.3438 0.0768 0.3711 0.1337 
DROAit 0.8284 1.0000 0.8239 1.0000 0.8471 1.0000 
SALEit 11.9114 11.8611 11.8673 11.8331 12.0906 11.9952 
OGit*SALEit 0.4906 0.0000 0.0611 0.0000 2.2375 0.0000 
ADJ_INCit 0.0148 0.0521 0.0097 0.0519 0.0356 0.0527 
CFOit 0.0342 0.0586 0.0303 0.0577 0.0500 0.0614 
CFOit-1 0.0317 0.0585 0.0276 0.0574 0.0481 0.0616 
ΔARit 0.0139 0.0052 0.0147 0.0057 0.0106 0.0034 
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ΔINVit 0.0088 0.0000 0.0093 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 
ΔAPit 0.0074 0.0000 0.0077 0.0000 0.0062 0.0000 
DEPit 0.0360 0.0325 0.0351 0.0319 0.0397 0.0349 
AMORTit 0.0027 0.0000 0.0030 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 
OTHERit -0.0222 -0.0093 -0.0243 -0.0103 -0.0137 -0.0060 
ACCit -0.0465 -0.0396 -0.0468 -0.0390 -0.0456 -0.0412 
ACCit-1 -0.0404 -0.0371 -0.0405 -0.0364 -0.0401 -0.0395 
RETit 0.0433 0.0353 0.0424 0.0343 0.0471 0.0394 
EPit 1.0416 0.9102 1.0858 0.9469 0.8617 0.7289 
CAPit 5.0445 4.9104 4.9936 4.8763 5.2513 5.0949 
AGEit 2.2993 2.3026 2.2563 2.1972 2.4739 2.4849 
ATOit 0.1744 0.0000 0.1765 0.0000 0.1657 0.0118 
ADJ_TAit ($bill.) 2.3406 0.1538 1.3857 0.1430 6.2249 0.2369 
Variable definitions are provided in Appendix A. 
4.3 Depreciation Choice Results 
Table 3 reports the probit regression results for Equation (1). As expected, the coefficients on 
RDit, LABORit, MFGit*COGSit, NMFGit*COGSit, ADVit, and LEVMVit are all negative and 
significant (p-values ≤ 0.017). Also, as expected, the coefficients on DPENit and OGit*SALEit 
are both positive and significant (p-value < 0.001). The coefficients on DURit, DROAit, and 
SALEit are all insignificant (p-values > 0.10), while the coefficient on NPit is significant in 
the opposite direction (p-value < 0.001) (Note 10). The pseudo R
2
 is 13.57 percent and the 
model is highly significant (p-value < 0.001). On balance, these results are quite comparable 
to the results in Bowen et al. (1995). Overall, the results for our sample in Tables 1, 2 and 3 
are also comparable to similar tables in Jackson et al. (2009). 
CHOICEit =λ0 + λ1DURit + λ2RDit + λ3LABORit + λ4DPENit + λ5(MFGit*COGSit) 
+ λ6(NMFGit*COGSit) + λ7NPit + λ8ADVit + λ9LEVMVit + λ10DROAit  
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Table 3. First stage probit regression of depreciation choice on economic determinants  
 Predicted    
Variables sign Coefficient Z-statistic p-value 
Intercept ? -0.182 -1.24 0.214 
DURit - 0.051 1.02 0.309 
RDit - -2.437 -8.29 < 0.001 
LABORit - -0.729 -9.10 < 0.001 
DPENit + 0.169 3.62 < 0.001 
MFGit*COGSit - -0.146 -2.40 0.017 
NMFGit*COGSit - -0.155 -3.53 < 0.001 
NPit - 1.236 4.67 < 0.001 
ADVit - -2.046 -2.77 0.006 
LEVMVit - -0.085 -3.53 < 0.001 
DROAit - -0.025 -0.82 0.410 
SALEit + -0.016 -1.38 0.169 
OGit*SALEit + 0.149 12.55 < 0.001 
Observations    56,303 
Pseudo R
2
 (%)    13.57 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Significance tests use standard errors clustered by firm. 
4.4 Depreciation Choice and Future Earnings Results 
Regression results for testing whether accelerated depreciation choice is associated with 
higher future performance are provided in Table 4 (future earnings) and Table 5 (future 
operating cash flows). Table 4 reveals that the coefficient on CHOICEit in Equation (2) is 
positive and statistically significant when the dependent variable is ADJ_INCit+1 (coefficient 
= 0.032, t-statistic = 10.54, p-value < 0.001), ADJ_INCit+2 (coefficient = 0.048, t-statistic = 
11.58, p-value < 0.001), and ADJ_INCit+3 (coefficient = 0.061, t-statistic = 12.01, p-value < 
0.001).  
The interpretation of the coefficient on CHOICEit is that adjusted income, expressed as a 
percentage of adjusted total assets, is reliably higher in periods t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively, 
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for firms that use accelerated depreciation compared with those firms that use straight-line 
depreciation. These findings are consistent with our hypothesis that the use of accelerated 
depreciation is correlated with higher future performance (i.e., proxied by future earnings).  
ADJ_INCit+j = β0 + β1CHOICEit + β2CFOit + β3ΔARit + β4ΔINVit + β5ΔAPit 
+ β6DEPit + β7AMORTit + β8OTHERit + β9CFOit-1 + β10ACCit-1  
+ β11RETit + β12EPit + β13CAPit + β14AGEit + β15ATOit  
+ β16MILLSit + εit                                                           (2a) 
Table 4. Second stage OLS regressions of future earnings on depreciation choice and 
economic determinants 
Panel A. ADJ_INCit+1 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.068 -25.31 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.032 10.54 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition 
from Barth et al. (2001) 
 
   
     CFOit + 0.692 61.80 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.548 31.41 < 0.001 
     ΔINVit + 0.497 23.85 < 0.001 
     ΔAPit – -0.556 -22.88 < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.155 4.41 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + -1.135 -9.79 < 0.001 
     OTHERit + 0.358 26.27 < 0.001 
Additional lags     
     CFOit-1 + 0.154 15.26 < 0.001 




   
     RETit + 0.009 10.77 < 0.001 
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     EPit – -0.026 -2.26 0.024 
     CAPit + 0.001 5.76 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.010 17.62 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.013 15.19 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.016 -8.89 < 0.001 
Observations    56,303 
Adjusted R
2
 (%)    56.09 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Panel B. ADJ_INCit+2 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.080 -21.07 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.048 11.58 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition from 
Barth et al. (2001) 
    
     CFOit + 0.532 42.05 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.357 18.08 < 0.001 
     ΔINVit + 0.350 14.66 < 0.001 
     ΔAPit – -0.429 -15.30 < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.350 7.70 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + -0.317 -2.17 0.030 
     OTHERit + 0.246 15.42 < 0.001 
Additional lags     
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     CFOit-1 + 0.175 15.63 < 0.001 
     ACCit-1 + 0.124 11.48 < 0.001 
Other economic determinants     
     RETit + -0.002 -1.58 0.115 
     EPit – -0.042 -2.71 0.007 
     CAPit + 0.002 5.13 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.011 14.56 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.016 14.04 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.026 -10.36 < 0.001 
Observations    49,175 
Adjusted R2 (%)    40.85 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Panel C. ADJ_INCit+3 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.084 -18.24 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.061 12.01 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition from 
Barth et al. (2001) 
    
     CFOit + 0.428 29.95 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.290 14.43 < 0.001 
     ΔINVit + 0.268 10.60 < 0.001 
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     ΔAPit – -0.386 -12.64 < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.402 7.71 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + 0.330 1.93 0.054 
     OTHERit + 0.215 11.96 < 0.001 
Additional lags     
     CFOit-1 + 0.190 15.76 < 0.001 
     ACCit-1 + 0.139 11.49 < 0.001 
Other economic determinants     
     RETit + -0.006 -5.53 < 0.001 
     EPit – -0.045 -2.59 0.010 
     CAPit + 0.002 5.50 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.011 11.81 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.018 12.58 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.034 -10.90 < 0.001 
Observations    42,794 
Adjusted R2 (%)    34.11 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Significance tests use standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 4 shows that the coefficients on the control variables in Equation (2) are significant in 
the predicted directions for earnings horizons of one, two, and three years ahead (p-values < 
0.001), except for AMORTit and RETit. The sign of the coefficient on AMORTit is significant 
in the opposite direction for earnings horizons of t+1 and t+2 (p-values ≤ 0.030). The sign of 
the coefficient on RETit is insignificant for the earnings horizon of t+2 (p-value = 0.115), 
while the sign of the coefficient on RETit is significant in the opposite direction for the 
earnings horizon of t+3 (p-value < 0.001) (Note 11). The coefficient on the self-selection 
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variable, MILLSit, in Table 4 is highly significant (p-value < 0.001), which verifies the 
appropriateness of using the two stage Heckman procedure. Finally, the explanatory power of 
the models is substantial, ranging from 34.11 percent (year t+3) to 56.09 percent (year t+1). 
4.5 Depreciation Choice and Future Cash Flows Results 
Table 5 reveals that the coefficient on CHOICEit in Equation (2) is positive and highly 
significant when the dependent variable is CFOit+1 (coefficient = 0.038, t-statistic = 15.53, 
p-value < 0.001), CFOit+2 (coefficient = 0.047, t-statistic = 13.56, p-value < 0.001), and 
CFOit+3 (coefficient = 0.056, t-statistic = 12.92, p-value < 0.001). The interpretation of the 
coefficient on CHOICEit is that operating cash flows, expressed as a percentage of adjusted 
total assets, are reliably higher in periods t+1, t+2, and t+3, respectively, for firms that use 
accelerated depreciation compared with those firms that use straight-line depreciation. These 
findings add further support to our hypothesis that the use of accelerated depreciation is 
correlated with higher firm performance (i.e., proxied by future cash flows). 
CFOit+j =β0 + β1CHOICEit + β2CFOit + β3ΔARit + β4ΔINVit + β5ΔAPit 
 + β6DEPit + β7AMORTit + β8OTHERit + β9CFOit-1 + β10ACCit-1  
 + β11RETit + β12EPit + β13CAPit + β14AGEit + β15ATOit  
+ β16MILLSit + εit                                                              (2b) 
Table 5. Second stage OLS regressions of future cash flows on depreciation choice and 
economic determinants 
Panel A. CFOit+1 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.035 -16.67 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.038 15.53 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition from 
Barth et al. (2001) 
 
   
     CFOit + 0.578 68.02 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.411 30.20 < 0.001 
     ΔINVit + 0.245 14.67 < 0.001 
     ΔAPit – -0.502   -25.87   < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.368 15.17 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + 0.465  6.75 < 0.001 
     OTHERit + 0.145 15.18 < 0.001 
Additional lags     
     CFOit-1 + 0.179 23.69 < 0.001 
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     ACCit-1 + 0.070 9.86 < 0.001 
Other economic determinants     
     RETit + -0.003  -4.16  < 0.001 
     EPit – -0.093  -9.93  < 0.001 
     CAPit + 0.002 9.79 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.004 10.38 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.009 12.90 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.022  -14.46   < 0.001 
Observations    56,303 
Adjusted R
2
 (%)    58.98 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Panel B. CFOit+2 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.044 -15.34 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.047 13.56 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition from 
Barth et al. (2001) 
    
     CFOit + 0.467 48.81 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.296 20.65 < 0.001 
     ΔINVit + 0.252 13.88 < 0.001 
     ΔAPit – -0.320  -15.02   < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.449 13.34 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + 0.595 6.10 < 0.001 
     OTHERit + 0.135 11.80 < 0.001 
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Additional lags     
     CFOit-1 + 0.183 22.15 < 0.001 
     ACCit-1 + 0.077 10.02 < 0.001 
Other economic determinants     
     RETit + -0.003  -4.89 < 0.001 
     EPit – -0.075  -6.22 < 0.001 
     CAPit + 0.003 10.96 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.005  8.03 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.011 11.78 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.028  -13.00  < 0.001 
Observations    49,175 
Adjusted R2 (%)    46.76 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Panel C. CFOit+3 
Variables Predicted sign Coeff. t-stat. p-value 
     Intercept ? -0.048 -13.57 < 0.001 
Test variable     
     CHOICEit + 0.056 12.92 < 0.001 
Earnings decomposition from 
Barth et al. (2001) 
    
     CFOit + 0.395 36.57 < 0.001 
     ΔARit + 0.268 16.68 < 0.001 
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     ΔINVit + 0.204 10.18 < 0.001 
     ΔAPit – -0.290  -12.34 < 0.001 
     DEPit + 0.470 11.63 < 0.001 
     AMORTit + 0.653   5.22 < 0.001 
     OTHERit + 0.111   8.45 < 0.001 
Additional lags     
     CFOit-1 + 0.179 19.46 < 0.001 
     ACCit-1 + 0.088 9.91 < 0.001 
Other economic determinants     
     RETit + -0.005  -6.12 < 0.001 
     EPit – -0.061  -4.46 < 0.001 
     CAPit + 0.004 11.15 < 0.001 
     AGEit + 0.004 5.92 < 0.001 
     ATOit + 0.012 10.43 < 0.001 
     MILLSit ? -0.033  -12.57 < 0.001 
Observations    42,794 
Adjusted R2 (%)    39.60 
Model p-value    < 0.001 
Variables are defined in Appendix A. Significance tests use standard errors clustered by firm. 
Table 5 shows that the coefficients on the control variables in Equation (2) are significant in 
the predicted directions for operating cash flow horizons of one, two, and three years ahead 
(p-values < 0.001), except for RETit (Note 12). The sign of the coefficient on RETit is 
significant in the opposite direction for each of the cash flow horizons considered (p-values < 
0.001), which suggests that evidence in prior research that stock returns foreshadow higher 
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future earnings does not hold for operating cash flows. The coefficient on the self-selection 
variable, MILLSit, in Table 5 is highly significant (p-value < 0.001), which verifies the 
appropriateness of using the two stage Heckman procedure. Finally, the explanatory power of 
the models is substantial, ranging from 39.60 percent (year t+3) to 58.98 percent (year t+1). 
5. Supplemental Analysis 
5.1 Depreciation Choice and Future Losses 
Table 2 indicates that loss years are much more common for straight-line firms than for 
accelerated firms. Losses occur in 9.24 percent of our sample firm years, but this frequency 
varies dramatically between straight-line firms and accelerated firms. For straight-line firms, 
losses occur in 10.35 percent of the firm years. However, for accelerated firms, losses occur 
in only 4.26 percent of the firm years. Given this difference, we explore whether firms’ 
depreciation choices foreshadow future losses. 
To address this question, we re-estimate Equation (2) with an alternative dependent variable, 
LOSSit. Because of the coding of this alternative dependent variable, the expected signs of 
the variables in Equation (2) by design will switch. In untabulated results, we find the 
coefficient on CHOICEit is negative and significant when the dependent variable is LOSSit+1 
(coefficient = -0.680, t-statistic = -6.51, p-value < 0.001), LOSSit+2 (coefficient = -0.726, 
t-statistic = -6.12, p-value < 0.001), and LOSSit+3 (coefficient = -0.885, t-statistic = 6.54, 
p-value < 0.001) (Note 13). These results imply that the use of accelerated depreciation 
foreshadows a lower incidence of future losses than the use of straight-line depreciation.  
5.2 Mix of Assets Using Alternative Depreciation Methods 
Our main sample categorizes an accelerated depreciation observation as one in which the 
Compustat footnote code suggests that accelerated depreciation is used for some or all of 
their depreciable assets. We drop from the analysis those observations that use both methods. 
That is, we test future performance of the group of accelerated depreciation (only) 
observations compared to with the straight-line depreciation (only) observations. The 
conclusions on the positive association of the choice variable to future performance are 
robust to this reduced sample.  
6. Conclusions 
This study provides evidence that firms’ depreciation choice is associated with future 
earnings and cash flows for horizons of one, two, and three years ahead. The suggestion that 
asymmetric information is the only factor in depreciation choice would not be justified. We 
make no such claim. The evidence does, however, indicate that information asymmetry can 
contribute to our understanding of accounting choices made by managers.  
A few caveats are worth noting as well as some directions for future research. First, in our 
research design, we attempted to control for a great deal of heterogeneity across firms. It is 
possible that our results could be explained (in part or in whole) due to our inability to 
consider such differences or due to poorly measured proxies employed in our controls. 
Second, the data sources used in the study for firms that choose accelerated depreciation lack 
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sufficient detail to consider the levels of asset classes subject to alternative depreciation 
methods. Future research could extend our study using data (likely hand collected) on the 
levels of asset classes subject to different depreciation methods. Third, we did not consider 
the variation in information asymmetry in our tests. A powerful test to extend our study might 
incorporate a reliable proxy for the variation in asymmetric information to investigate 
whether the signaling we document in depreciation choice is positively correlated with the 
degree of information asymmetry. 
In sum, our findings are consistent with a large body of theoretical and empirical research in 
corporate finance and economics on signaling theory. We offer empirical evidence that 
accounting choices can be explained (in part) by incentives to signal, most likely due to the 
problem of adverse selection.  
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Notes 
Note 1. In a survey of CFOs, Graham et al. (2005) states that ―an overwhelming majority of 
CFOs prefer smooth earnings (versus volatile earnings). Holding cash flows constant, volatile 
earnings are thought to be riskier than smooth earnings. Moreover, smooth earnings ease the 
analyst’s task of predicting future earnings. Predictability of earnings is an over-arching 
concern among CFOs. The executives believe that less predictable earnings—as reflected in a 
missed earnings target or volatile earnings—command a risk premium in the market. A 
surprising 78% of the surveyed executives would give up economic value in exchange for 
smooth earnings‖ (page 5). 
Note 2. Fields et al. (2001) provides a broad definition for accounting choice. They state that 
an ―accounting choice is any decision whose primary purpose is to influence (either in form 
or substance) the output of the accounting system in a particular way, including not only 
financial statements published in accordance with GAAP, but also tax returns and regulatory 
filings‖ (page 256). 
Note 3. The positive association between firms’ use of accelerated depreciation and higher 
future cash flows cannot be attributed to taxes. This is because firms compute tax 
depreciation using rules prescribed by the Internal Revenue Code, while they compute 
financial reporting depreciation using rules prescribed by GAAP. There is no requirement 
that tax depreciation and financial reporting depreciation conform to one another. Thus, 
similar tax depreciation can occur regardless of the depreciation method chosen for financial 
reporting purposes for specific long-lived assets. Additionally, neither method of financial 
depreciation will be equivalent to tax depreciation. Thus, the choice of accelerated or 
straight-line offers no administrative cost savings. Furthermore, the argument of relative cost 
savings of straight-line over accelerated methods seems implausible given the apparent costs 
of lower near-term earnings and higher earnings volatility. 
Note 4. Leland and Pyle (1977) has been confirmed by other studies (Grinblatt and Hwang 
1989; Fan 2007). 
Note 5. In our example of accounting choice, earnings satisfies the Law of Conservation of 
Income (Sunder 1997, p. 67) because any differences in income in one period will eventually 
be reversed over the life of an asset. 
Note 6. Compustat annual data items are the source of financial accounting data, except for 
the variable CHOICEit, which is obtained from the annual footnote data in Compustat. 
Note 7. Our definition of income excludes depreciation expense because we wish to purge 
from income the effect of firms’ depreciation choice. When we add back depreciation, we 
express this variable on an after tax basis using the firm’s effective tax rate (ETR) (i.e., we 
multiply depreciation expense by 1 – total income taxes / pretax income). Without this 
change, CHOICEit would be functionally associated with earnings. Following Gupta and 
Newberry (1997), we set ETR to 1 when ETR is greater than 100 percent and we set ETR to 
0 when ETR is negative. Our inferences and conclusions are not affected by defining 
ADJ_INCit on a pre-depreciation expense basis. 
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Note 8. We require the values of EPit be between zero and positive infinity because negative 
values for this variable have limited meaning. However, our inferences and conclusions are 
the same regardless of whether we impose this constraint on EPit. 
Note 9. Also, for the variable DROAit in Equation (1), we exclude firm years in which there 
are fewer than ten firms within a two-digit SIC code. 
Note 10. In Bowen et al. (1995), the coefficient on NPit was insignificant in each year 
examined and its sign was inconsistent across years. 
Note 11. This finding suggests that while stock returns lead earnings for relatively short 
horizons (i.e., t+1), they do not lead earnings for longer horizons (i.e., t+2 and t+3). 
Note 12. In Table 5, the signs of the coefficients on the earnings decomposition variables are 
the same as the signs on those variables in Barth et al. (2001). 
Note 13. We have omitted the tables for the supplemental analyses to ease the exposition.  
 
Appendix 
Appendix A. Variables Used in the Study 
CHOICEit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms that use the accelerated depreciation 
method for all or some of their assets, and 0 for firms that use the straight-line depreciation 
method;  
DURit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms producing durable goods (SIC codes 150 – 179, 
245, 250 – 259, 283, 301, and 324 – 399), and 0 otherwise;  
RDit = research and development expense scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if RD expense is missing);  
LABORit = labor intensity measured as one minus the ratio of gross property, plant, and 
equipment to ADJ_TAit (0 if gross property, plant, and equipment is missing);  
DPENit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with defined benefit pension plans, identified 
as those firms with a non-negative value for projected pension obligation or assumed rate of 
return for pension benefits, and 0 otherwise;  
MFGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for manufacturing firms (SIC codes 200-399), and 0 
otherwise;  
NMFGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for non-manufacturing firms (all SIC codes except 
200-399), and 0 otherwise;  
COGSit= cost of goods sold scaled by ADJ_TAit;  
NPit = notes payable scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if notes payable is missing);  
ADVit= advertising expense scaled by ADJ_TAit (0 if advertising expense is missing);  
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LEVMVit = ratio of long-term debt to market value of common stock (0 if long-term debt is 
missing);  
DROAit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms with return on assets (defined as income 
before extraordinary items and discontinued operations scaled by ADJ_TAit) in deciles 2 
through 9, where deciles are defined within two-digit SIC codes, and 0 otherwise;  
SALEit = natural logarithm of net sales in thousands;  
OGit = dummy variable equal to 1 for firms in the oil and gas industry (SIC codes 131 and 
291), and 0 otherwise;  
ADJ_INCit+j = income before extraordinary items and discontinued operations plus 
depreciation expense scaled by ADJ_TAit;  
CFOit+j = net cash flow from operating activities minus the accrual portion of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations reported on the statement of cash flows scaled by 
ADJ_TAit;  
ΔARit = change in accounts receivable from the statement of cash flows scaled by ADJ_TAit 
and multiplied by -1; ΔINVit = change in inventory from the statement of cash flows scaled 
by ADJ_TAit and multiplied by -1;  
ΔAPit = change in accounts payable and accrued liabilities from the statement of cash flows 
scaled by ADJ_TAit;  
DEPit = depreciation expense, computed as depreciation and amortization expense minus 
amortization expense (coded as 0 if amortization expense is missing) scaled by ADJ_TAit;  
AMORTit = amortization expense (coded as 0 if amortization expense is missing) scaled by 
ADJ_TAit;  
OTHERit = net of all other accruals, calculated as income before extraordinary items and 
discontinued operations scaled by ADJ_TAit – (CFOit + ΔARit + ΔINVit – ΔAPit – DEPit – 
AMORTit);  
CFOit-1 = net cash flow from operating activities minus the accrual portion of extraordinary 
items and discontinued operations reported on the statement of cash flows scaled by 
ADJ_TAit;  
ACCit-1 = total accruals scaled by ADJ_TAit;  
RETit = stock return, computed as the year-to-year change in closing stock price divided by 
the prior year closing stock price; 
EPit = earnings-to-price ratio if the ratio is non-negative and 0 if the ratio is negative, where 
the earnings-to-price ratio is defined as income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations divided by the market value of common equity; 
CAPit = logarithm of the market value of common equity;  
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AGEit = logarithm of number of years firm has been listed on CRSP;  
ATOit = asset turnover, defined as net sales divided by ADJ_TAit;  
ADJ_TAit = average of beginning of year and end of year adjusted total assets, where 
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